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Abstract
This paper o¤ers a model of crowdfunding that represents a growing
area of interest among practitioners and theorists. It is one of the rst
articles analyzing the choice between the di¤erent types of crowdfunding
(reward-based vs. equity-based) and the choice between crowdfunding
and traditional nancing. The model is based on standard market im-
perfections such as asymmetric information and moral hazard as well as
on some specic features of crowdfunding including the market feedback
regarding new projects. The model provides several implications, most of
which have not yet been tested. For example, we nd that when asym-
metric information is important, high-quality projects prefer reward-based
crowdfunding. The choice of an all-or-nothing mechanism as opposed to
a keep-it-all can serve as a signal of a rms quality ("signalling by risk-
bearing"). Crowdfunding is selected over a traditional bank loan if the
demand for the product is either very small or very large.
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1 Introduction
Crowdfunding is the practice of funding a start-up company or project by raising
funds from a large number of people. It is usually performed on-line. The volume
of funds raised using crowdfunding has been quickly growing the last 5-7 years.
In 2009 the volume of funds raised using crowdfunding was negligeably small.
This article previously circulated as "Crowdfunding: Balancing Imperfect Information
and Moral Hazard Considerations". We are grateful to Peter Klein, the participants of Royal
Economic Society annual conference and anonymous referees for the very helpful comments.
Also, many thanks to Jason Pavunkovic, Kory Lippert, Alia Raza, Shane Smith, Michael
Kidd, Jamie Grasman, Jonathon Dean, Melissa Toner, Erin Clark, and all the participants of
the numerous discussions on crowdfunding organized by www.journalofcapitalstructure.com
website for their comments.
yBirmingham City University. anton.miglo@bcu.ac.uk.
zUniversity of Toronto, v.miglo@mail.utoronto.ca
1
In 2014, crowdfunding platforms raised $16.2 billion, which is an increase from
the $6.1 billion raised in 2013. Crowdfunding has more than doubled since
then and raised $34.4 billion in 2015. Some analysts predict that crowdfunding
market size will grow at an annual rate of 27.8% and will surpass venture capital
investments in the near future.1 Kickstarter, which is the leading crowdfunding
platform in the US, has raised over $2.4 billion in pledges from 10.9 million
backers to fund almost 107,000 creative ideas.2
Crowdfunding research is quickly growing.3 As we are writing this article,
the number of empirical papers signicantly exceeds the number of theoretical
papers. Empirical papers on crowdfunding have found the following: crowd-
funding relaxes geographic constraints on fundraising, which inhibit venture
capital and angel nancing (Agrawal et al. (2010)); asymmetric information
and signalling seem to play a signicant role in crowdfunding (Ahlers, Cum-
ming, Guenther, and Schweizer (2015), Hildebrand, Puri, and Rocholl (2014));
success of a project and its delays are related to the volume of nancing it re-
ceives (Mollick (2014)); the timing of contributions usually follows a pattern
(Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2015b)). Yet, the literature still lacks a full under-
standing of how entrepreneurs choose between di¤erent types of crowdfunding
and how they decide whether to use crowdfunding or other types of nancing. In
this paper we try to shed some light on these questions. We build a model that
addresses some of the aspects of crowdfunding mentioned above. In addition,
our model incorporates other major features of crowdfunding. For example,
in the case of crowdfunding the market provides intense feedback regarding a
rms projects and products. Unlike venture capital and bank nancing, there
is no major investor with crowdfunding, who often maintain a certain degree of
monitoring and control over the rms activities. As a result, the entrepreneur
may be subject to a higher dregree of moral hazard (Agrawal, Catalini, and
Goldfarb (2013), Moritz and Block (2014), Strausz (2017)). Finally, the owners
may have better information about the quality of their products and their costs.
We focus on the two leading types of crowdfunding: reward-based crowd-
funding (used by Kickstarter-the leading platform in the area) and equity-based
crowdfunding. In the case of reward-based crowdfunding, investors count on
some extra-benets from the company such as future product discounts. Under
equity-based crowdfunding investors will receive shares of the company. Reward-
based crowdfunding campaigns are commonly o¤ered in one of two models. The
Keep-It-All(KIA) model involves the entrepreneurial rm setting a fundrais-
ing goal and keeping the entire amount raised, regardless of whether or not they
meet their goal, thereby allocating the risk to the crowd when an underfunded
project goes ahead. The All-Or-Nothing(AON) model involves the entrepre-
1See, for example, Salman (2016) or a global crowdfunding report on
http://crowdfundbeat.com/2016/02/03/report-global-crowdfunding-market-2016-2020/
2Kickstarter website (June 1, 2016):
https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats?ref=about_subnav
3Moritz and Block (2014) and Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2015a) provide a review of the
literature in this eld. For international aspects of crowdfunding see, for example, Gabison
(2015), Miglo (2017), or Hateld (2017).
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neurial rm setting a fundraising goal and keeping nothing unless the goal is
achieved, thereby shifting the risk to the entrepreneur. Kickstarter follows an
all or nothingor threshold model, so funderspledged money is only collected
if the goal is reached. While other crowdfunding e¤orts do not always follow
this model, it is currently the dominant approach to crowdfunding, and parallels
the way that other funding e¤orts for new ventures work. Our model is also re-
ective of the fact that crowdfunding is an area where production decisions and
nance are closely connected. The crowdfunding method choice directly and
indirectly a¤ects the development of a project and its promotion, production
scale and price decisions.
In our model each type of nancing has its cost and benets. Under reward-
based crowdfunding, it is harder to achieve the fundraising goal with large
projects since the funderspotential benets do not include the rms long-term
prots unlike under equity-based crowdfunding. On the other hand, the en-
trepreneurs stake of equity is reduced under equity-based crowdfunding, which
a¤ects pricing and production decisions. In particular, we nd that in this case,
prices are higher and production quantities are lower than optimal since the
entrepreneur receives less than 100% of the benets from increasing production
while bears a non-shared extra-cost, therefore, the entrepreneur chooses a lower
level of production. We also nd that high-quality projects are likely to chose
reward-based crowdfunding as a signal of quality. Also, they are more likely to
be funded through the AON scheme. Low-quality or high-risk projects are less
likely to mimick high-quality rms and chose AON, which implies more fundras-
ing responsability and risks, and prefer KIA instead. Traditional bank nancing
may lead to bankruptcy if the rm is unsuccessful. So the magnitude of the
bankruptcy cost plays a role in the nancing method choice. If these costs are
high enough, the entrepreneur may prefer crowdfunding since, formally, crowd-
funding does not neccessarily lead to bankruptcy if the crowdfunding campaign
or production fails. However, under reward-based crowdfunding, indirect costs
of distress may arise related to consumer protection law in case products are
not delivered to customers. We nd that a separating equilibrium where high-
quality rms select reward-based crowdfunging can only exist if these costs are
relatively high. Finally, unlike traditional nancing, crowdfunng provides mar-
ket feedback. When this feature of crowdfunding is introduced into the basic
model, we nd that crowdfunding is selected over a traditional bank loan if the
demand for the product is either very small or very large.
As was mentioned previously, the number of theoretical papers on crowd-
funding is relatively small. Note the following. Belleamme, Lambert, and
Schwienbacher (2010) identify a number of issues related to crowdfunding from
an industrial organization perspective. In their model, they analyze reward-
based crowdfunding with pre-ordering and price discrimination, and study the
conditions under which crowdfunding is preferred to traditional forms of exter-
nal funding. In the second model, crowdfunding is a way to make a product
better known to consumers. The authors argue that non-prot organizations
tend to be more successful in using crowdfunding.
Belleammey, Lambertz and Schwienbacher (2014) compare reward-based
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and equity-based crowdfunding. In either case, the funders enjoy community
benets that increase their utility. It is shown that the entrepreneur prefers
pre-ordering if the initial capital requirement is relatively small compared to
the market size and prefers prot sharing otherwise. Belleammey et al (2014)
also o¤er some extensions on the impact of quality uncertainty and information
asymmetry but in these extensions the choice between di¤erent forms of crowd-
funding and other forms of nancing is not modelled. As the authors mentioned,
further research is required.
Strausz (2017) studies entrepreneursinteractions with customers before in-
vestment using the mechanism design approach. Under aggregate demand un-
certainty, crowdfunding improves the screening of potential customers. Entre-
preneurial moral hazard threatens this benet. Studying the subsequent trade-
o¤ between screening and moral hazard, the paper characterizes optimal mech-
anisms. E¢ ciency is sustainable only if returns exceed investment costs by a
margin reecting the degree of moral hazard. Constrained e¢ cient mechanisms
exhibit underinvestment.
Hu, Li, and Shi (2014) study the optimal product and pricing decisions in a
crowdfunding all-or-nothing mechanism. When the buyers are su¢ ciently het-
erogenous in their product valuations, the creator should o¤er a line of products
with di¤erent levels of product quality. Compared to the traditional situation
where orders are placed and fullled individually, with the crowdfunding mech-
anism, a product line is more likely to be optimal than a single product and the
quality gap between products is smaller. The paper also shows the e¤ect of the
crowdfunding mechanism on pricing dynamics over time. Together, these results
underscore the substantial inuence of the emerging crowdfunding mechanisms
on common marketing decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic
model and some preliminary results. Section 3 through 6 discuss the conse-
quences of introducing di¤erent kinds of market imperfections into the basic
model and their implications for crowdfunding decisions. Section 7 analyzes
cases that involve several market imperfections simultaneously. Section 8 dis-
cusses the consistency of the models predictions with observed empirical evi-
dence. Section 9 discusses the models robustness and its potential extensions
and Section 10 is a conclusion to the study.
2 Basic Model
An entrepreneurial rm has monopoly power over its innovative product or ser-
vice. The xed costs of launching the production equal I. The rm intends
to sell its product in two consecutive periods. In period t = 1; 2, if the rm
produces qt units, it costs cqt in total. The demand for the good in each period
is given by the inverse demand function pt = a   qt.4 The rm needs funds to
4Some papers use the approach where there are individual customers with di¤erent demand
functions (see, for example, Belleammey et al (2014) and Hu, Li and Shi (2014)) or where
there is a possibility of product substitution between periods. Section 9 discusses the models
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cover its start-up costs and is considering crowdfunding. Under reward-based
crowdfunding the rm collects pre-orders for period 1.5 Under equity-based
crowdfunding, the rm sells a fraction  of the rm. Funders and entrepreneurs
are assumed to be risk-neutral and the risk-free interest rate is 0. A two-period
model will help us understand the di¤erence between basic features of di¤er-
ent types of crowdfunding (like long-term character of earnings in the case of
equity-based crowdfunding vs. short-term rewards in the case of reward-based
crowdfunding) as well as capture some other important features of crowdfund-
ing such as incorporating market feedback during period 1 into the product
quality. Since crowdfunding is usually used to cover the start-up costs, period
2 nancing is not explicitly modelled. The capital structure and the ownership
structure will remain the same in period 2 as they are at the end of period 1.
Earnings will be distributed accordingly.
2.1 Reward-Based Crowdfunding: Pre-orders
The timing of events is as follows:
1. Firm selects p1 (pre-order price). The demand for the product is de-
termined. If p1q1 < I + cq1, the rm is liquidated.6 Otherwise, the
entrepreneur collects prot (p1   c)(a  p1)  I.
2. Firm selects p2. The entrepreneur collects prot (p2   c)(a  p2).
In this setting, the rm selects a pre-order price in order to maximize its
prots. The constraint, however, comes from the necessity to collect the amount
of money required to launch production.
In period 2, the rm chooses p2 to maximize (p2   c)(a   p2), which gives
p2 =
a+c
2 .
In period 1, the rm maximizes (p1   c)(a   p1)   I subject to: p1q1 =
p1(a  p1)  I + cq1 = I + c(a  p1). This condition means that the amount of
pre-orders should cover the start-up cost (xed costs and the period 1s variable
costs).
Two cases are possible. If
(a  c)2
4
 I (1)
robustness with regard to changes in the demand functions and other features of the model.
5Existing studies consider consumer nancing through pre-ordering, bootstrap nancing
(see, e.g., Winborg and Landstrom, 2001; and Ebben and Johnson, 2006) or working capital
loans. However, they do not usually distinguish between advance payments made at the very
beginning of an entrepreneurial initiative and those made during the course of further devel-
opments. Crowdfunding pertains specically to the nancing of innovative entrepreneurial
projects. There are many features of this type of nancing such as market feedback from
a large number of funders, which is typically not included in existing studies on consumer
nancing or bootstrap nancing etc.
6The presence of thresholds for the minimum required amount of funds (the poject fails if
the thresholds are not met) is typical in crowdfunding. We begin our analysis with a natural
assumption as to why this occurs: a rms inability to cover the start-up costs. In Section 5
we will discuss other reasons for possible thresholds.
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then p1 = a+c2 .
The rms prot over the two periods equals
 =
(a  c)2
4
  I + (a  c)
2
4
=
(a  c)2
2
  I (2)
If (1) fails, the rm will not be able to raise the funds needed to launch
the production. When the required amount of initial investment is quite large,
reward-based crowdfunding may not be an option.
2.2 Equity-Crowdfunding: Prot-Sharing
The timing of events is as follows:
1. Firm selects  (the fraction of the rm for sale) and p1 and sells  for
price M . If M < I + cq1, the rm is liquidated.
2. Firm selects p2.
In this setting, the rm has more exibility in rasing the initial amount of
investments, since the funders can also count on the second periods (future)
prot.
In period 2, the rm chooses p2 to maximize the entrepreneurs prot (1  
)(p2 c)(a p2), which makes p2 = a+c2 . The rms prot in period 2 is (a c)
2
4 .
In period 1, the rm chooses  and p1 to maximize the entreprneurs ex-
pected prot over the two periods:
(1  )(p1(a  p1) +M   I   cq1 + (a  c)
2
4
) (3)
subject to
M  I + cq1 (4)
The fundersexpected earnings should cover their investment cost or:
(p1(a  p1) + (a  c)
2
4
) M (5)
For the optimal solution the conditions (4) and (5) will be binded because
the rm can always make  as small as necessary to satisfy them. Then we
have:
 =
I + cq1
p1(a  p1) + (a c)24
(6)
Substituting this into (3) makes the entrepreneurs expected prot over the two
periods equal to:
(p1   c)(a  p1)  I + (a  c)
2
4
This implies p1 = a+c2 .
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The entrepreneurs expected prot then equals
(a  c)2
4
  I + (a  c)
2
4
=
(a  c)2
2
  I (7)
As we can see, it is the same amount as in (2). This is not surprising given
that in the absence of any nancial market imperfections every type of nancing
should have the same result (similar to Modigliani-Miller proposition (1958)) as
long as they t into the budget constraints.
Lemma 1. If I is su¢ ciently small ( (a c)
2
4  I), the rm is indi¤erent
between reward-based and equity-based crowdfunding. If I is large, equity-based
crowdfunding is preferred.
The proof of this lemma follows from the above analysis. If I is small, the
rms prot is the same under the two types of crowdfunding ((2) and (7)). If I
is large, it follows from the previous subsection that the rm is not able to raise
enough funds to cover its start-up costs using a reward-based crowdfunding.
Lemma 1 shows that equity-based crowdfunding has a "technical" advantage
for large projects (high xed costs I and high variable costs c). Since our focus
is on the role of market imperfections, we will usually assume that condition (1)
holds in the further analysis, i.e. both types of crowdfunding are feasible.
3 Moral hazard: costly entrepreneurial e¤ort
So far we assumed that the decisions about  and p1 are made simultaneously.
We know, however, that under equity-based crowdfunding, the entrepreneurs
share of the company is less than 100% after funds are raised and therefore the
entrepreneurs incentive may be di¤erent than it would be under reward-based
crowdfunding.7 Hence, we consider a situation where the cost of production
also includes the entrepreneurs own e¤ort. We assume that this e¤ort costs eq.
Following similar calculations to those in the previous subsection, one can see
that under reward-based crowdfunding p1 = p2 = a+c+e2 and the entrepreneurs
prot equals
(a  c  e)2
2
  I (8)
Under equity-based crowdfunding the results may be di¤erent because of the
entrepreneurial moral hazard resulting from the reduced equity stake.
The timing of events is as follows:
1. Firm selects  and sells it for price M .
2. Firm selects p1.
3. Firm selects p2.
7This is a classical moral hazard idea (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
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Proposition 1. 1) If (a c e)
2
2  I, the rm prefers reward-based crowd-
funding; 2) Prices are higher and the quantity produced is lower under equity-
based crowdfunding than under reward-based crowdfunding.
Proof. See Appendix.
As shown in the Appendix, p1 = p2 =
a+c+e(1 )
2 . Under equity-based
crowdfunding, the price is higher than it is under reward-based crowdfunding.
This is intuitive because the entrepreneur reaps less than 100% of the benets
from increasing production while bears a non-shared extra-cost, therefore, the
entrepreneur chooses a lower level of production.
It is also shown that the entrepreenurs prot over the two periods equals
(a  c)2
2
  I   e
2
2(1  )2 +
e2
1     ea+ ec (9)
If  = 0, (9) will be equal to (a c e)
2
2   I. It was mentioned above that it
would be the same value as it would be in the case of reward-based crowdfunding.
When  is positive, the entrepreneurs prot under equity crowdfunding will be
smaller since the derivative of (9) in  is negative. It is consistent with the idea
of agency cost.
4 Asymmetric information about cost
So far we assumed that investors have the same information as entrepreneurs.
Now suppose that the rm can be either a low-cost (high-e¢ ciency) producer
(denoted l) or a high cost (low-e¢ ciency) producer (denoted h). More speci-
cally, suppose that c is either equal to cl or ch and cl < ch. Initially the rms
type (the value of c) is determined and becomes known to the entrepreneur.
The timing of events is as follows:
1. The rms type is revealed to the entrepreneur.
2. Firm selects nancing strategy: reward-based crowdfunding or equity-
based crowdfunding.
3. If equity-based crowdfunding is selected,  is determined and the rm sells
it for price M . If M < I + cq1, the rm is liquidated.
4. Firm selects p1.
5. Firm selects p2.
An equilibrium is dened as a situation where no rm type has an incentive to
deviate. Since private information only concerns the production cost and not the
demand side, the informational game will only a¤ect the equity-crowdfunding
scenario.8 The price that potential investors will be paying for a fraction of
8We mostly focus on separating equilibria since it generates meaningful empirical impli-
cations. Further reserach is required regarding the exisitence and implications of pooling
equilibria.
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a rms shares depends on their beliefs about the rms production cost. The
information game does not a¤ect the outcome of reward-based crowdfunding.
Firms will select their prices as in the case with perfect information and demand
will be determined by the demand functions that are publicly known in this
scenario.9 This leads to the point that if a separating equilibrium exists, it will
not be one where the high-e¢ ciency type chooses equity-based crowdfunding
since it will always be mimicked by the low-e¢ ciency type. This result is typical
for basic models with asymmetric information beginning with Akerlo¤ (1970).
Proposition 2. If I is su¢ ciently small ( (a cl)
2
4  I), an e¢ cient sep-
arating equilibrium exists, where type l selects reward-based and type h selects
prot-sharing. An e¢ cient separating equilibrium where type h selects reward-
based and type l selects prot-sharing does not exist.
Proof. See Appendix
5 Asymmetric information about demand
In this section, asymmetric information concerns the quality of a rms products
and services. In particular, we assume that, unlike outside investors, rm owners
know the value of parameter a in the demand function. In the setup discussed
in the previous section, a low-quality rm will always have an incentive to
mimick a high-quality rm when the latter uses equity-based crowdfunding.
Intutively, a similar engine should drive the results if the asymmetric information
regards the products quality rather than its cost. In order to obtain new results,
we introduce new strategies. In particular, if the rm selects reward-based
crowdfunding, it has two options: KIA (keep-it-all) or AON (all-or-nothing). If
AON is selected, a threshold T is set, T > 0. If the amount of funds raised in
period 1 is less than T , the rm is liquidated. We also assume that the demand
is as follows: qt = t(a   pt), where t = 1 with probability  and 0 with
probability 1 . Making the demand function stochastic or risky will allow us
to see the role of AON method of crowdfunding ("signalling by risk-bearing").10
Note that some empirical research suggests that many crowdfunding projects
attract very low or negligeably small amounts of funds (see, for example, Mollick
(2014), Cordova, Dolci and Gianfrate (2015) and Desjardins (2016)). 1 becomes
known after the project is created and the crowdfunding method is selected. 2
becomes known in the beginning of period 2. Also, we assume that there are
two types of rms: a = ah for type h and a = al for type l, where ah > al. To
focus on the e¤ect of asymmetric information, we assume, I = 0 (none of the
results change qualitatively if I > 0). In particular it implies that condition (1)
holds for both types of rms meaning they can use reward-based crowdfunding.
Also, it means that a rm should follow the rule p > c in order to accumulate
9 In the next section we will consider a situation with asymmetric information about de-
mand.
10For simplicity, previous sections did not di¤erentiate between the di¤erent types of reward-
based crowdfunding. One can easily check that it would not a¤ect the results. The same holds
with the assumption about the stochastic demand function.
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su¢ cient funds to launch their product and avoid liquidation.
The timing of events is as follows:
1. The rms type is revealed to the entrepreneur.
2. Firm selects nancing strategy: KIA, AON or equity-based crowdfunding.
If AON is selected, the rm selects T .
3. 1 becomes known.
4. If equity-based crowdfunding is selected, the rm selects  (fraction of
shares) and sells it for an amount M .
5. Firm selects p1.
6. If AON is selected and p1q1 < T , the rm is liquidated.
7. If KIA or AON and p1q1 < cq1, the rm is liquidated. If equity-based
crowdfunding is selected and M < cq1, the rm is liquidated.
8. Firms type (products quality) becomes publicly known.
9. 2 becomes known.11
10. Firm selects p2.
First consider the symmetric information case for KIA.
In period 2, if 2 = 1 and q = a   p2, the rm chooses p2 to maximize
(p2   c)(a   p2), which makes p2 = a+c2 . If 2 = 0 and q = 0, the rms prot
is zero.
In period 1, if 1 = 1 and q = a   p1, the rm maximizes (p1   c)(a   p1).
We have p1 = a+c2 . If 1 = 0 and q = 0, the rms prot is zero.
The rms expected prot equals
 = 
(a  c)2
4
+ 
(a  c)2
4
=
(a  c)2
2
(10)
Now consider AON. In this setting, the rm selects the pre-order price in order
to maximize its sales. At the same time, it needs to reach the established
threshold amount of pre-orders. In some cases it will force the rm to select
a suboptimal pricing policy and in some cases (when the initial investment is
su¢ ciently large), the project will not be successful. Also, bankruptcy is unavoi
dable under AON, if the demand is zero.
In period 2, if 2 = 1 and q = a   p2, the rm chooses p2 to maximize
(p2   c)(a   p2), which makes p2 = a+c2 . If 2 = 0 and q = 0, the rms prot
is zero.
11 In this section, the timing of information revelation about a products quality and demand
is the same for any type of crowdfunding. In Section 7, we analyze the di¤erences between
di¤erent types of crowdfunding in terms of their ability to a¤ect products quality.
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In period 1, the rm chooses T and p1 to maximize  where  = ((p1  
c)(a  p1) +  (a c)
2
4 ) if p1q1 = p1(a  p1)  T .
 = 0 if p1q1 = p1(a  p1) < T .
The solution is any T such as T  p1(a   p1) where p1 = a+c2 . It does not
avoid liquidation if demand is zero in period 1 but it optimizes the price policy
if demand is positive.
The rms expected prot equals
 = (
(a  c)2
4
+ 
(a  c)2
4
) =
(1 + )(a  c)2
4
(11)
This is smaller than (10) because under AON, bankruptcy will occur in
period 1 if the amount of raised funds is smaller than T .
Finally, consider equity-based crowdfunding. In period 2, if 2 = 1 and
q = a   p2, the rm chooses p2 to maximize the entrepreneurs prot (1  
)(p2   c)(a   p2), which makes p2 = a+c2 . If If 2 = 0 and q = 0, the rms
prot is zero. The rms expected prot in period 2 is (a c)
2
4 .
In period 1, if 1 = 1 and q = a  p2, the rm chooses  and p1 to maximize
the entrepreneurs prot:
(1  )(p1(a  p1) +M   cq1) (12)
subject to
M  cq1 (13)
The fundersexpected earnings over the two periods should cover their in-
vestment cost or:
(p1(a  p1) + (a  c)
2
4
) M (14)
Under the optimal solution the conditions (13) and (14) will be binded be-
cause the rm can always make  as small as necessary to satisfy them. Then
we have:
 =
cq1
p1(a  p1) + (a c)24
Substituting this into (12) and using the fact that if 1 = 0 and q = 0, shares are
not sold and the rms prot in period 1 equals 0, we nd that the entrepreneurs
expected prot over the two periods equals:
(p1   c)(a  p1) + (a  c)
2
4
This implies that p1 = a+c2 .
The entrepreneurs expected prot then equals
(a  c)2
4
+
(a  c)2
4
=
(a  c)2
2
(15)
As we can see, this is the same amount as in (10).
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Now consider asymmetric information.
Proposition 3. If ( al cah c )
2 <  < 2   (ah cal c )2, a separating equilibrium
exists, where type l selects keep-it-all and type h selects all-or-nothing or equity-
based crowdfunding. An equilibrium where type h selects keep-it-all or equity-
based crowdfunding does not exist.
Proof. See Appendix.
The right side of the inequality in Proposition 3 puts an upper bound on
the probability of bankruptcy. The intuition behind this result is as follows.
AON is very costly if the probability that the demand is absent is relatively
high. In this case the low-quality rm will not mimick the high-quality rm. If,
on the contrary,  is very large, the values of (10), (11) and (15) do not di¤er
signicantly for the low-quality rm (they are equal in the extreme case when
 = 1) which means that the low-quality rm would mimick the high-quality
rm and benet from the markets optimistic belief about the quality of rms
that use AON. The left side of the inequality in Proposition 3 places a lower
bound on the probability of bankruptcy. If, on the contrary, the probability
that demand is absent is very high, it would be benecial for the high-quality
rm to not use AON and deviate to KIA or equity-based crowdfunding.
6 Bankruptcy costs and bank monitoring
In this section we compare crowdfunding with bank nancing. If the rm takes
a bank loan and it is not able to pay back its debt then the rm is bankrupt and
can be liquidated. On the other hand, banks have a better ability to monitor and
control entrepreneurs.12 So we assume that the manager (managerial team) has
some private benets b from each unit produced at the expense of the rm when
the rm uses crowdufunding. To simplify the calculations related to bankruptcy
we assume that the production output is stochastic in period 1 and depends on
parameter Q (similar to stochastic demand in Section 5): Q = 1 with probability
 and 0 with probability 1  . This implies that bankruptcy will only occur if
the rm takes a bank loan and Q = 0. In contrast to rm liquidation cases when
the required nancing is not raised, bankruptcy does not occur as a result of
failed production if the rm uses crowdfunding.13 For simplicity assume I = 0.
This implies that the condition (a c b)
2
4  I holds for both rm types, which
implies that crowdfunding is feasible for each type (similar to Section 3, formula
(8)).
The timing of events is as follows:
12See, for example, Diamond (1984).
13 In most countries there is no formal regulation that can be used to force a company into
bankruptcy in the case of crowdfunding (see, for example, Gabison (2015) or Moores (2015)).
There is di¤erence, however, between equity-based and reward-based crowdfunding. If the
rm uses reward-based crowdfunding then the consumers are under consumer protection law
etc. (Gabison (2015)). We consider this aspect in Section 7. Here we assume that in contrast
to traditional bank nancing there is no bankruptcy in the case of crowdfunding. For simlicity
it is assumed that the rm uses equity-based crowdfunding.
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1. Firm selects nancing strategy: bank loan or crowdfunding.
2. Firm selects p1.
3. Q becomes known. If Q = 0 and bank loan was selected, the rm is
bankrupt.
4. Firm selects p2.
Proposition 4. 1) Prices are higher and quantity produced is lower under
crowdfunding; 2) For given values of a and , there exists a b such that the rm
chooses to take a bank loan if b  b and chooses crowdfunding if b < b. For
given values of a and b, the rm chooses to take a bank loan if  is su¢ ciently
large.
Proof. See Appendix.
We nd that the product price under bank nancing is p = a+c=2 and
p = a+(b+c)=2 under crowdfunding. Prices are higher and quantity produced
is lower under crowdfunding because of the extra-cost related to moral hazard
issues. The second part of the proposition states that crowdfunding will be
preferred if the cost related to the absence of monitoring is relatively small.
Otherwise, a bank loan will be preferred. Interestingly, the e¤ect of a change
in the probability of bankruptcy is not as straightforward as the e¤ect of b. If
the probability of bankruptcy is close to zero then a bank loan will denitely be
preferred because of the monitoring advantage. However, in the middle range of
the values for , one may nd that an increase in  benets crowdfunding more
than a bank loan. The reason for this follows from the price formulas above: a
small  amplies the rms moral hazard issues making the price further from
optimal.
7 Hybrid cases
Ideally, the next step would be to analyze optimal nancing policy when many
factors such asymmetric information, moral hazard, market feedback etc. are
present in the model simultaneusly. This is an intriguing challenge for future
research. One should say that the creation of such a universal global model
is technically di¢ cult and in many cases may not bring many analytical and
intuitively sound results.14 This section provides an example of such an analysis.
14A good example is capital structure theory. Most intuitions published in textbooks for
the last 50 years are based on models that consider each factor separately (pecking order
theory for asymmetric inofrmation, trade-o¤ thoery for taxes and bankruptcy costs etc.). For
an example of capital structure theory review and the role of market imperfections see Harris
and Raviv (1991), Miglo (2011) and Miglo (2016). Models combining several factors are much
less popular and much more technically complicated though some researchers suggest that
these types of models are a prominnet direction for future research. Also note that based
on managers surveys, managers only support around 50% (see, for example, Graham and
Harvey (2001)) of basic theories, which means that the precentage of managers that use even
more complicated ideas is even smaller. Crowdfunding theory is a much younger theory than
13
Case 1. Consider the situation where rms have private information about
production costs (Section 4). In this situation reward-based crowdfunding can
be used as a signal of a rms quality. Now suppose that a rm is terminated
(bankrputcy occurs) in period 1, if the rm is not able to deliver its product
to customers and the rm uses reward-based crowdfunding (similar to the ideas
from sections 5 and 6). Gabison (2015) noted15 that eventhough there is no
formal regulation of reward-based crowdfunding in most countries, in most cases
consumers (funders) are under consumer protection law (which exists in most
developed countries) and therefore a violation of this law can be costly for the
rm. As in Section 4, c is either equal to cl or ch and cl < ch. Like in Section
6, the production output is stochastic in period 1 and depends on parameter
Q (similar to stochastic demand in Section 6): Q = 1 with probability  or 0
with probability 1  . Bankruptcy only occurs when Q = 0 and the rm uses
reward-based crowdfunding. Bankruptcy does not occur as a result of failed
production in period 1 under equity-based crowdfunding since by its nature no
promises are made to funders/investors and dividends are not guaranteed. Like
in Section 5, for simplicity we assume I = 0.
The timing of events is as follows:
1. The rms type is revealed to the entrepreneur.
2. Firm selects nancing strategy: reward-based crowdfunding or equity-
based crowdfunding.
3. If equity-based crowdfunding is selected,  is determined and the rm sells
it for price M .
4. Firm selects p1.
5. If equity-based crowdfunding is selected and M < cq1, the rm is liqui-
dated. If reward-based crowdfunding is selected and p1q1 < cq1, the rm
is liquidated.
6. Q becomes known. If Q = 0 and reward-based crowdfunding was selected,
the rm goes bankrupt.
7. Firm selects p2.
An equilibrium is dened as a situation where no rm type has the incentive
to deviate. Like in Section 4, since information only concerns the production
cost and not the demand side, the informational game will only a¤ect the equity-
crowdfunding scenario.
capital structure theory so it is in the stage of its development where the quality and relative
simplicity of its basic ideas are probably the most important objectives of its research along
with managerial education on these ideas (see, for example, Loane, Ramsey and Ibbotson
(2016)).
15See also Ibrahim (2016) and Moores (2015) for a legal environment analysis regarding
reward-based crowdfunding. Mollick (2015) empirically analyzes the percentage of failed rms
that used reward-based crowdfunding.
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Proposition 5. If a cla ch < 2, a separating equilibrium does not exist. Oth-
erwise, if  is su¢ ciently large, the only e¢ cient separating equilibrium that
exists is one where type l selects reward-based crowdfunding and type h selects
prot-sharing.
Proof. See Appendix.
To explain the results of this proposition, note that Section 4 found that
high-quality rms can use reward-based crowdfunding to signal their quality.
That section did not consider a potential cost of reward-based crowdfunding re-
lated to bankruptcy in the case when the rm is not able to deliver their product
in period 1. This case asks if the result stands if such a cost is taken into con-
sideration. What we found is that the result stands but there are cases when a
separating equilibrium where a high-quality rm uses reward-based crowdfuning
does not exist. The meaning of the condition stated in the proposition is that if
the di¤erence between the rm types is su¢ ciently small, such an equilibrium
may not exist. Secondly and more interestingly is that if the probability of
bankruptcy is su¢ ciently small, an equilibrium may not exist. In this case, a
low-quality rm may still be interested in mimicking a high-quality type when
the latter choses reward-based crowdfunding.
Case 2. Similar to some previous sections, this case considers a model with
imperfect information. However, here we assume that crowdfunding helps the
rm obtain information about demand. Suppose that if the rm uses crowd-
funding, it can improve the products quality after obtaining useful information
about demand in period 1: more specically, in period 2 the demand becomes
q = sa   p; s  1.16 We assume that s has di¤erent values for di¤erent types
of crowdfunding: s 2 fsr; seg ; sr > se where sr is the product improvement if
reward-based crowdfunding is used. sr > se because under reward-based crowd-
funding, the funders know that the rms launch of production and, respectively,
its survival depend on their pre-orders and the rms response to this feedback
is expected to be very e¢ cient since the rms survival depends on it.17 Also,
under reward-based crowdfunding, the funders have a short-term interaction
with the rm whereas under equity-based crowdfunding, these interactions are
long-term. So the former incentivizes the funders to provide a more intense
feedback. If the rm uses traditional nancing like a bank loan, for example, it
does not get the same feedback as it would with crowdfunding and the demand
does not change in period 2. On the other hand, as in Section 6, banks have a
16Xu, Yang, Rao, Fu, Huang, and Bailey (2014), Block, Hornuf and Moritz (2016) and da
Cruz (2016) empiricaly analyze di¤erent aspects of the informational value of crowdfunding
for entrepreneurs.
17Note that the market feedback represents probably the most important community benet
of crowdfunding for the rm (because it may increase its product quality and repsectively their
future prots) as well as for funders and customers who can enjoy higher quality products as
a result of market feedback. Note also that we explicity model this mechanism in our model
through providing better information to the rm in period 1, which allows them to improve
their products quality in period 2 etc. Belleammey et al (2014) assume that there are some
exogenously given community benets in period 1 as a result of crowdfunding. Note that
Cholakova and Clarysse (2015) nd that non-monetary benets do not play a singicant role
for funders.
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better ability to monitor and control the entrepreneurs.18 We assume that the
manager has some private benets b when using crowdfunding.
The timing of events is as follows:
1. Firm selects a nancing strategy: bank loan, reward-based crowdfunding
or equity-based crowdfunding.
2. If equity-based crowdfunding is selected, the rm chooses  (the fraction
of the rm for sale) and sells it for price M . If M < I + cq1, the rm is
liquidated.
3. Firm selects p1. The demand for the product is determined.
4. Firm selects p2. The demand for the product is determined.
Proposition 6. For a given value of a, if I is su¢ ciently small, the rm
takes a bank loan if sr is su¢ ciently small or b is su¢ ciently large. Other-
wise, the rm selects reward-based crowdfunding. If I is su¢ ciently large,
the rm takes a bank loan if se is su¢ ciently small or b is su¢ ciently
large. Otherwise, the rm selects equity-based crowdfunding. Prices are
higher and quantity produced is lower under crowdfunding. For a given
value of I, crowdfunding is selected over a traditional bank loan if a is
either very small or very large. For medium levels of a, a bank loan is
preferred.
Proof. See Appendix.
It shown in the Appendix that the entrepreneurs prots under the di¤erent
strategies are equal to the following.
r =
(a  b  c)2
4
+
(sra  b  c)2
4
  I
e =
(a  b  c)2
4
+
(sea  b  c)2
4
  I
b =
(a  c)2
2
  I
where subscript r stands for reward-based crowdfunding, e means equity-
based crowdfunding and b means bank loan.
The rm is indi¤erent between reward-based crowdfunding and a bank loan
if
(a  b  c)2
2
+
(sra  b  c)2
2
= (a  c)2 (16)
The rm is indi¤erent between equity-based crowdfunding and a bank loan
if
(a  b  c)2
2
+
(sea  b  c)2
2
= (a  c)2 (17)
18Other traditional forms of entrepreneurial nancing such as venture capital nancing also
have a high degree of monitoring so the model can be applied to those cases as well.
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Also if
(a  c  b)2 < 4I (18)
the rm will not be able to use reward-based crowdfunding. And if (a c b)2 
4I, the rm prefers reward-based crowdfunding over equity-based crowdfunding.
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium decision-making for the entrepreneurs.
The lines represent equations (16), (17) and (18). Letters RC, EC and B
denote the areas where the entrepreneurs choose reward-based crowdfunding,
equity-based crowdfunding, and a bank loan respectively.
-
6
I
a
B
EC
EC
(18)
(16)
(17)
B
RC
RC
Figure 1. The choice of nancing.
As follows from Figure 1, rms that use crowdfunding are either projects
with very small demand or very high demand. Also, entrepreneurs with EC
have higher I for any value of a compared to entrepreneurs with RC. Overall
we can see that rms with a medium level of demand prefer B, rms with
stronger demand prefer crowdfunding, rms with a large amount of investments
and strong demand or very weak demand prefer EC and rms with smaller
investments and strong demand or very weak demand prefer RC.
8 Implications
Our paper has several implications for an entrepreneurial rms choice of nanc-
ing. The summary of the results is presented in Table 1.
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Market imperfection(s) Results
Asymmetric information about produc-
tion cost
Good quality projects prefer reward-
based crowdfunding
Entrepreneurs moral hazard due to his
reduced equity stake
Firms prefer reward-based crowdfunding.
Prices are higher and quatity produced is
lower under equity-based crowdfunding
Asymmetric information about demand "Signalling by risk-bearing". Low-quality
rm selects KIA or equity-based crowd-
funding and high-quality rm selects
AON
Bankruptcy costs vs. bank monitoring Prices are higher and quantity produced
is lower under crowdfunding than under a
bank loan
Hybrid case 1 (asymmetric information
about demand and bankruptcy costs)
If bankrupcy costs are high, rms use
reward-based crowdfunding to signal their
quality
Hybrid case 2 (market feedback, bank
monitoring)
Prices are higher and quantity produced is
lower under crowdfunding. Crowdfunding
is selected over a traditional bank loan if
demand is either very small or very large.
Table 1. Market imperfections and the models results.
Proposition 2, 3 and 5 imply that when asymmetric information is important,
high-quality projects prefer reward-based crowdfunding. This is contradictory,
to some extent, to the spirit of the results in Belleammey et al (2014), which
nds that asymmetric information favors equity-based crowdfunding.19 Note,
however, that the objective of their analysis is di¤erent from ours. For example,
they do not analyze the case when the decision about the choice of crowdfund-
ing mode is part of the model (this is obviously a crucial part of our model;
consequently they automatically do not consider the possibility that rms can
signal their quality with their choice of crowdfunding) so they only compare
the symmetric and asymmetric information cases within each type of crowd-
funding. Also, it is mentioned in Belleammey et al (2014) that their analysis of
the asymmetric information case is not complete.20 In our model, equity-based
crowdfunding su¤ers more from asymmetric information, which is consistent
with the spirit of the majority of nance literature where equity-nancing is
19For example, it is well-known in capital structure theory that asymmetric information
damages equity nancing more than debt nancing and that equity nancing can not be used
by a high-quality type as a signal of quality whereas in some cases debt nancing can be used
(Leland and Pyle (1977)). So applying this example to Belleamey et al (2014), who claim
that asymmetric information is more damaging for reward-based crowdfunding, it would be
no surprise to nd that a separating equilibrium where a high-quality rm uses reward-based
crowdfunding does not exist or that there is a separating equilibrium where the high-quality
rm uses equity-based crowdfunding.
20Among other things note, for example, that the proof of Lemma 5, which is crucial for
Proposition 2, relies on numerical simulations, Section 4.2.2 is not nished and, as mentioned
above, the case when the decision about the choice of crodwfunding mode is part of the model
is not analyzed.
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generally the most sensitive to the asymmetric information problem. Equity-
based crowdfuning cannot be used as a signalling tool by a high-quality rm
since it will always be mimicked by a low quality rm as the share price of a
high-quality rm is always higher than that of a low-quality rm. In contrast,
a high-qulity can use reward-based crowdfunding. This is because a low-quality
rm may nd it unproftable to mimick this strategy as it will be taking more
risk to achieve its threshold. This prediction has not been directly tested but
is consistent with the spirit of the results found in Ahlers, Cumming, Guen-
ther, and Schweizer (2015) and Mollick (2014) (that the rms nancing choice
can serve as a signal of a projects quality). Furthermore, the entrepreneurs
larger fraction of equity is associated with a higher project quality. In our case,
reward-based crowdfunding implies a higher fraction of ownership held by the
entrepreneur. Ahlers et al (2015) examine the e¤ectiveness of the signals used
by entrepreneurs to induce (small) investors to commit nancial resources in
an equity-based crowdfunding context. They found that retaining equity is an
e¤ective signal and can therefore strongly impact the probability of a fundings
success. It is consistent with the spirit of our result that reward-based crowd-
funding may be preferred by entrepreneurs of higher quality.
Proposition 3 implies that high-quality projects may prefer AON over KIA.
This is consistent with the spirit of Cumming, Leboeuf and Schwienbacher
(2014). They show that KIA campaigns are less successful in meeting their
fundraising goals. Also, note that the rate of success of campaigns on Kick-
starter, which only uses AON, is higher than on Indiegogo.21
Proposition 1 and 4 imply that pricing and production strategies are af-
fected by moral hazard issues and the costs of nancial distress. In particular,
prices can be higher and quantity produced can be lower under equity-based
crowdfunding. This is consistent with Paakkarinen (2016) that noted that in
contrast to pre-ordering, prot sharing may have fewer customers, but higher
margins. More broadly, the point that moral hazard issues related to the entre-
preneurial cost of e¤ort and the reduced equity stake are more important, under
equity-based crowdfunding is consistent with Gabison (2015) and Paakkarinen
(2016), which noted that equity-based crowdfunding is much more constricted
in comparison to other forms of crowdfunding.
As follows from Moores (2015), the bankruptcy procedure is not clearly
dened in the case of a failed crowdfunding campaign, in fact, the rm may
not even be declared bankrupt even though consumers are under the customer
protection law (at least in the case of reward-based crowdfunding). As noted in
Moores (2015), further development and clarications in this area are helpful.
Our analysis suggests that from a policy perspective higher bankruptcy costs are
benetial for the exsitence of separating equilibria where high-quality rms can
use reward-based crowdfunding to singal their quality and avoid being mimicked
by low-quality rms.
As follows from Proposition 6, rms should avoid crowdfunding if moral
21See, for example:
http://crowdfunding.cmf-fmc.ca/facts_and_stats/how-likely-is-your-crowdfunding-
campaign-to-succeed
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hazard considerations related to the weak ability of funders to monitor the rm
(compared to traditional nancing from bank loans or venture capital nancing)
are very important. These results are consistent with Xu (2017) that nds that
entrepreneurs swich between crowdfunding an bank borrowing depending on the
relative costs of nancing. Also, and perhaps more interestingly is that if we
only consider reward-based crowdfunding vs. bank nancing (the area above line
(18) in Figure 1), projects with high I and high a, i.e potentially high risk, high
investment (novelty) and potentially high demand (a) will prefer crowdfunding
vs. bank nancing. This is also consistent with Xu (2017). Finally, we nd that
rms should use crowdfunding for either projects with a very small demand
or a very high demand. Also, rms that use equity-based crowdfunding have
a higher amount of xed costs compared to entrepreneurs with reward-based
crowdfunding.
In Belleammey et al (2014) price discrimination is not possible in the absence
of non-monetary benets, and therefore both forms of crowdfunding yield ex-
actly the same outcome as seeking money from a bank or a large equity investors.
Some research discovered however that the role of such non-monetary benets in
crowdfunding is negligeable (see, for example, Cholakova and Clarysse (2015)).
In our model, there are no non-monetary benets from crowdfunding but the
benets of crowdfunding (compared to traditional nancing) arise from natural
features of crowdfunding such as market feedback. Note that overall, the focus
of most existing theoretical papers on cowdfunding has been to exploit features
of crowdfunding like the opportunity for the entrepreneur to price discriminate.
However, recent literature nds empirically that crowdfunding also has a lot of
informational value for entrepreneurs. Hence, our article mostly focuses on the
latter aspect of crowdfunding.
Finally, note that from Lemma 1, large projects, in most cases, prefer equity-
based crowdfunding. As mentioned previously, in our case this is not due to the
presence of nancial market imperfections but to the fact that funders can count
on long-term rm prots in the case of equity-based crowdfunding. As mentioned
previously, this result in Belleammey et al (2014) is due to the assumptions
about community benets in period 1 when rm conducts crowdfunding. These
benets di¤er among funders in the case of a reward-based campaign so the
small size of the crowdfunding allows the rm to capture these di¤erences very
e¢ ciently, while in the equity-based case community benets are more uniform
so there is no advantage of having a small scale. As follows from Paakkarinen
(2016), equity-based campaigns are much larger than reward-based campaigns
but rms select equity-based campaigns mostly for possibility of collecting a
large amounts of capital and not to select a better price discrimination approach.
9 The model extensions and robustness
Di¤erent demand functions. Our focus in this article is to analyze the role
of di¤erent market imperfections in crowdfunding. That is why we adopt a
relatively simple demand function. In dynamic monopoly pricing literature
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this approach is not unusual (see, for example, Demichelis and Tarola (2006)).
Most of our results (such as Propositions 1, 2 etc.) are intuitively sound and
will hold if mathematically di¤erent demand functions are used. Alternatively,
a sigicantly di¤erent approach of modelling the demand side can be taken
where individual customers with di¤erent demand functions are included (see,
for example, Belleammey et al (2014) and Hu, Li and Shi (2014)). This approach
is often used in industrial organization or price discrimination literature. Our
focus is on market imperfections and nancial aspects of crowdfunding and the
approach that uses total demand functions from investors/funders (the market)
is very common.22 Note also that Belleammey et al (2014) make the ad-hoc
assumption that crowdfunding provides an automatic benet to funders.
Di¤erent types of moral hazard. In our model (Section 3), the entrepre-
neurial moral hazard takes place because the entrepreneurs equity stake in the
rm is reduced while his individual e¤ort is costly and this cost is not shared.
This approach is very common in nancing literature (starting with Jensen and
Meckling (1976)) and typically creates an agency cost of equity nancing as in
our paper. There are many di¤erent ways to analyze moral hazard issues, for
example, to explicitely model the entrepreneurs level of e¤ort. This apaproach
is quite common in contract literature. In nance literature this approach was
used, for example, in Innes (1991). The result of that analysis reveals the advan-
tage of debt nancing over equity nancing which is consistent with the spirit
of our modelling where equity-based crowdfunding has a disadvantage due to
entrepreneurial moral hazard. In Section 6 we again use moral hazard to com-
pare crowdfunding and bank loans using the idea that bank nancing provides
better monitoring. This idea is standard in nance literature (see, for example,
Diamond (1984)).
The distribution of types. In sections 4 and 5, which deal with asymmetric
information we use two types of rms to illustrate the main ideas. This is also
very typical in literature. A natural question though is whether the results
stand if one considers a case with multiple types. Our analysis shows23 that
most conclusions remain the same: under asymmetric information, equity-based
crowdfunding is an inferior choice compared to reward-based crowdfunding. In
the case of multiple types, however, one may have a semi-separating or even
pooling equilibrium where only the type with the highest cost (speaking about
Section 4) will be indi¤erent between the two types of crowdfunding and all
other types select reward-based crowdfunding. In Section 5, our analysis shows
22One can further discuss the similarity between the two approaches. One can see, for
example, that in the spirit of that literature our model can be interpretted as a case with one
customer in each period without the possibility of product substitution between periods. One
can see though that if substitution is allowed between periods, most results would stand since
the period 2 product price is not less than the period 1 price in most cases so it makes no
sense for this customer to wait until period 2 to purchase the product. Introducing numerous
customers with di¤erent product valuations will denitely complicate the model, however,
most intutions in this paper will not be a¤ected.
23Proofs are available upon demand. Note that the calculations become much longer and
technically more complicated, which is very typical for multiple types games with asymmetric
information.
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that the results may hold even in a multiple types environment though more
research is required. The main implication of our analysis holds. In particular,
our results show that there is no semi-separating equlibrium where the average
quality of types that choose equity-based crowdfunding or the KIA method is
higher than those that choose AON, which is consistent with our basic model.
Mixed nancing and more types of nancing. Unlike capital structure liter-
ature, where debt/equity mix is a very common strategy (as opposite to pure
equity or pure debt nancing), simultaneously conducting di¤erent kinds of
crowdfunding is not common. Nevertheless, if mixed nancing is allowed in
period 1, most results will stand. For example, if mixing bank debt and crowd-
funding is allowed in period 1, as in Section 2, the results stand though the
condition (1) can be softened for a rm if it uses equity-based crowdfunding.
Similarly, Proposition 1 stands qualitatively but the formulas will be quanti-
taively di¤erent. In Sections 3 and 4, a signalling equilibrium may still exist
where a high-quality rm uses a mix of reward-based crowdfunding and a bank
loan or a mix of a bank loan and AON, as in Section 4, although restricting
conditions will change quantitatively. Introducing additional nancing strate-
gies such as debt-based crowdfunding is an interesting direction. Most resutls
regarding the costs and benets of di¤erent nancing strategies found in this
paper are quite general and do not depend on introduction of more options in
the model. Quantitatively though, some conditions may change. It is denitely
an interesting direction for future research. Note that most existing theoretical
literature on crowdfunding does often consider reward-based and equity-based
crowdfunding separately from debt-based crowdfunding. One of the reasons
for this seems to be that the founders objectives are quite di¤erent in these
scenarios (see, for example, Hildebrand, Puri, and Rocholl (2014)).
10 Conclusions
Most existing theoretical papers on crowdfunding consider static models.24 This
paper is one of the rst papers that analyzes a dynamic (two-period) model of
crowdfunding. Existing theoretical literature on crowdfunding has extensively
focused on such features of crowdfunding as price discrimination. This paper is
one of the rst that focuses on information aspects of crowdfunding, which is
more in the spirit of nance literature than industrial organization literature. In
particular, this is one of the rst papers that obtains analytical results for models
with asymmetric information. Most existing literature focuses more on moral
hazard issues. Also, this paper is one of the rst that analyzes the choice between
di¤erent types of crowdfunding (reward-based vs. equity-based) and the choice
between crowdfunding and traditional nancing. In addition to traditional forms
24Technically there are two periods in Belleammey et al (2014) but only one period of
production. Periods 1 and 2 in their model di¤er in that there is pre-ordering in period 1 (or
stock sales) and production takes place in period 2. In our model, pre-ordering and stage 1
production happen in the same period. The presence of two production periods allows us to
capture an essential di¤erence between reward-based and equity-based crowdfunding: under
equity-based crowdfunding funders can count on long-term rm prots.
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of markets imperfections (asymmetric information, moral hazard, bankruptcy
costs etc.) our model includes some other features of crowdfunding such as
market feedback. The model provides several implications, most of which have
not been yet been tested. When asymmetric information is important, high-
quality projects prefer reward-based crowdfunding. The choice of the all-or-
nothing mechanism as opposed to keep-it-all can serve as a signal of a rms
quality. Finally, crowdfunding is selected over a traditional bank loan if the
demand for the product is either very small or very large.
Appendix
Proof of proposition 1.
In period 2, the rm chooses p2 to maximize the entrepreneurs prot
(1  )(p2   c)(a  p2)  e(a  p2) (19)
, which makes p2 =
a+c+e(1 )
2 .
In period 1, after shares are sold, the rm chooses p1 (q1 = a   p1) to
maximize
(1  )(p1(a  p1) +M   I   cq1)  e(a  p1) (20)
subject to M  I + cq1. Two cases are possible. If a+c+e(1 )2  I Mc + a we
have p1 =
a+c+e(1 )
2 . Otherwise we have a corner solution p1 =
I+ca M
c . In
both cases, under the optimal strategy chosen by the rm M = I + cq1.
The funders anticipate it and thereforeM and  will be connected as follows:
M = (p1(a  p1) + (p2   c)(a  p2)) = I + c(a  p1) (21)
Then we have:
 =
I + c(a  p1)
p1(a  p1) + (p2   c)(a  p2)
Substituting this into (19) and (20) we get that the entrepreneurs expected
prot over the two periods equal to:
(p1   c  e)(a  p1)  I + (p2   c  e)(a  p2) (22)
In the beginning of period 1, the entrepreneur selects  to maximize (22). The
case where a+c+e(1 )2 <
I M
c + a is not optimal. The rm should increase
M and  becasue of the following. (22) is concave in p1 and p1 = a+c+e2 is an
optimal p1 in (22). Further p1 =
a+c+e(1 )
2 is closer to the optimum than
p1 =
I+ca M
c . So we have p1 = p2 =
a+c+e(1 )
2 .
Using the above formulas for p1 and p2, (22) can be converted into
(a  c)2
2
  I   e
2
2(1  )2 +
e2
1     ea+ ec (23)
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If  = 0, (23) will be equal to (a c e)
2
2   I. This is the same value as under
a reward-based crowdfunding scenario. When  is positive, the entrepreneurs
prot under equity crowdfunding will be smaller since the derivative of (23) in
 is negative.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider a situation where l selects reward-based
crowdfunding and h selects prot-sharing. If I is su¢ ciently small, we have
(based on Section 2 calculations)
h =
(a  ch)2
2
  I (24)
l =
(a  cl)2
2
  I (25)
where j is the equilibrium prot of type j (all calculations are based on the
symmetric information case for each type described in the previous section).
Also we have (as follows from (21))
h =
2I + ch(a  ch)
ah(a  ch) (26)
h does not have an incentive to mimick l since, as mentioned above, in this
section asymmetric information does not concern reward-based crowdfunding.
So if h chose reward-based crowdfunding it would have the same payo¤ as it
would in equilibrium: (a ch)
2
2   I. Now suppose that l mimics h and chooses
equity-based crowdfunding instead. ls prot lh then equals
lh = (1  h)(p1q1 + (p2l   cl)(a  p2l))
In this equation p2l = a+cl2 (as follows from Section 2) and h is determined by
(26). Note that when l mimicks h, it has to sell a larger stake of equity in the
rm compared to the symmetric information case. Indeed if l sells equity under
symmetric information we have
l =
2I + cl(a  cl)
al(a  cl) (27)
This is smaller than (26) because cl < ch. Note that the amount of funds raised
will be di¤erent under symmetric information. Keeping unused cash is useless
so prices and quantities will be di¤erent from the symmetric information case
for type l. More specically, we have
q1 =
ch(a  p1h)
cl
p1 = a  q1
Indeed, I + chqh = I + ch(a   p1h) is the amount of funds raised for selling
shares. From this amount, I will cover the xed costs for l. The remaining
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amount ch(a p1h) will be used to cover the variable costs of production, which
are equal to cl per unit for type l. Also
p1h =
a+ ch
2
It implies
lh = (1  2I + ch(a  ch)
ah(a  ch) )((a 
ch(a  ch)
2cl
)
ch(a  ch)
2cl
+
(a  cl)2
4
)
This is less than (25) because cl < ch. Therefore l will not mimick h.
Now consider a situation where h selects reward-based crowdfunding and l
selects prot-sharing. As before we have
h =
(a  ch)2
2
  I (28)
l =
(a  cl)2
2
  I
Suppose that h mimics l and chooses equity-based crowdfunding instead. Using
similar reasoning one can show that hs prot hl equals
lh = (1  2I + cl(a  cl)
al(a  cl) )((a 
cl(a  cl)
2ch
)
cl(a  cl)
2ch
+
(a  ch)2
4
)
This is greater than (28) because cl < ch. Therefore h will mimick l. This
means that such an equilibrium does not exist.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider a situation where type l selects keep-it-all
and type h selects all-or-nothing. First we have
1h =
(1 + )(ah   c)2
4
(29)
1l =
(al   c)2
2
(30)
where 1j is the equilibrium prot of type j (all calculations are based on the
symmetric information case for each type described in the previous section).
Suppose that l mimics h and chooses AON. We have
lh = ((p1h   c)(ah   p1h) +  (al   c)
2
4
)
where p1l = al+c2 and p1h =
ah+c
2 .
We have
lh =
(ah   c)2
4
+
2(al   c)2
4
Comparing this with (30) we nd that the former is greater if
 < 2  (ah   c
al   c )
2 (31)
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and therefore type l has no incentive to deviate.
Suppose that h mimics l and chooses KIA. We have
hl = 
(al   c)2
4
+ 
(ah   c)2
4
Comparing with (29) we nd that h does not deviate if
 > (
al   c
ah   c )
2 (32)
Note that conditions (31) and (32) do not contradict each other. It is because
the right side of (32) is smaller than that of (31). Indeed let x = ( al cah c )
2. Then
the following makes the comparison described in the previous sentence:
x < 2  1
x
, which always holds.
Consider a situation where type h selects keep-it-all and type l selects all-
or-nothing. First we have
1h =
(ah   c)2
2
(33)
1l =
(1 + )(al   c)2
4
(34)
where 1j is the equilibrium prot of type j (all calculations are based on sym-
metric information case for each type described in previous section). Suppose
that l mimics h and chooses KIA. We have
lh = 
(ah   c)2
4
+ 
(al   c)2
4
This is greater than (34) because ah > al and  < 1. So a situation where type
h selects keep-it-all and type l selects all-or-nothing is not an equilibrium.
Finally, consider a situation where type h selects equity-based crowdfunding.
We have
1h =
(ah   c)2
2
(35)
1l  (al   c)
2
2
(36)
(if l selects KIA, (36) holds as an equality). Suppose that l mimics h and chooses
equity-based crowdfunding. ls prot lh then equals
lh = (1  h)(p1l(al   p1l) + (p2l   c)(al   p2l))
where:
h =
c
ah
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p1l = p2l =
al + c
2
It implies
lh = (1  c
ah
)
al(al   c)
2
This is greater than (36) because al < ah. Therefore l will mimick h and such
an equilibrium does not exist.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Consider crowdfunding. Calculations are similar to Section 4. In period 2,
the rm chooses p2 to maximize the entrepreneurs prot (1 )(p2 c b)(a 
p2), which makes p2 =
a+(b+c)=
2 .
In period 1, after the shares are sold, the rm chooses p1 to maximize (1 
)(p1(a  p1) +M   (c+ b)q1) subject to
M  (c+ b)q1 (37)
. It implies:
p1 =
a+ (c+ b)=
2
(38)
. The rms expected prot in period 1 is p1(a p1) =  (a+(c+b)=)(a (c+b)=)4 .
The fundersexpected earnings should cover their investment cost or:
(
(a+ (c+ b)=)(a  (c+ b)=)
4
+
(a  (c+ b)=)2
4
) M (39)
Under optimal solution the conditions (37) and (39) will be bounded because
the rm can always make  as small as necessary to satisfy them. Then we have:
 =
(c+ b)q1
 (a+(c+b)=)(a ch=)4 +
(a (c+b)=)2
4
=
ca (c+b)=2
a(a (c+b)=)
2
=
c+ b
a
The entrepreneurs expected prot over the two periods equals:
(1  (c+ b)
a
)(
a(a  (c+ b)=)
2
) =
(a  c  b)2
2
(40)
Consider bank loan nancing. In period 2, the rm chooses p2 to maximize
(p2   c)(a  p2) which makes p2 = a+c=2 . Note that this is smaller than (38).
The rms expected prot in period 2 is (a c=)
2
4 .
In period 1, the rm maximizes (p1(a  p1)+ (a c=)
2
4 )  c(a  p1) subject
to: p1q1 = p1(a  p1)  cq1 = c(a  p1).
The solution gives us p1 =
a+c=
2 .
The rms prot over the two periods equals
 =
(a  c=)2
4
+
2(a  c=)2
4
=
(1 + )(a  c)2
4
(41)
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The comparison of (40) and (41) leads to the rst part of Proposition 4. In
particular, (40) is decreasing, which implies that the rm prefers crowdfunding
if b is su¢ ciently small. Also, when  = 1, (41) is strictly greater than (40).
Proof of Proposition 5.
Consider a situation where l selects reward-based crowdfunding and h selects
prot-sharing.
Consider rm h. Calculations are similar to Section 4. In period 2, the rm
chooses p2 to maximize the entrepreneurs prot (1 )(p2 ch)(a p2), which
makes p2 =
a+ch=
2 .
In period 1, after the shares are sold, the rm chooses p1 to maximize (1 
)(p1(a  p1) +M   chq1) subject to
M  cq1 (42)
. It implies: p1 =
a+ch=
2 . The rms expected prot in period 1 is p1(a p1) =
 (a+ch=)(a ch=)4 . The fundersexpected earnings should cover their investment
cost or:
(
(a+ ch=)(a  ch=)
4
+
(a  ch=)2
4
) M (43)
Under the optimal solution the conditions (42) and (43) will be bounded
because the rm can always make  as small as necessary to satisfy them. Then
we have:
 =
chq1
 (a+ch=)(a ch=)4 +
(a ch=)2
4
=
ch
a ch=
2
a(a ch=)
2
=
ch
a
The entrepreneurs expected prot over the two periods equals:
(1  ch
a
)(
a(a  ch=)
2
) =
(a  ch)2
2
(44)
Consider rm l. In period 2, the rm chooses p2 to maximize (p2 cl)(a p2)
which makes p2 =
a+cl=
2 . The rms expected prot in period 2 is
(a cl=)2
4
In period 1, the rm maximizes (p1(a p1)+ (a cl=)
2
4 ) cl(a p1) subject
to: p1q1 = p1(a  p1)  clq1 = cl(a  p1). The solution gives us p1 = a+cl=2 .
The rms prot over the two periods equals
l =
(a  cl=)2
4
+
2(a  cl=)2
4
=
(1 + )(a  cl=)2
4
(45)
Suppose that l mimics h and chooses equity-based crowdfunding instead. ls
prot lh then equals
lh = (1  h)(p1l(a  p1l)  cl(a  p1l) + p2l(a  p2l)  cl(a  p2l))
where:
h =
ch
a
(46)
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p1l = p2l =
a+ cl=
2
(47)
It implies
lh = (1  ch
a
)
a(a  cl=)
2
=
(a  ch)(a  cl=)
2
(48)
(48) is smaller than (45) if the following holds:
2
(1 + )
<
a  cl
a  ch (49)
The left side of this inequality is decreasing in  and the right side is increasing
in . So we have two cases. If a cla ch < 2, the condition (49) does not hold for
0 <   1 and a separating equilibrium does not exist. Otherwise it holds if 
is su¢ ciently high.
Secondly, in order to have an equilibrium, h should not have an incentive to
switch to reward-based crowdfunding. In this case, this is a trade-o¤ between
bankruptcy cost and the cost of moral hazard. If h switches to reward-based
crowdfunding its payo¤ equals:
hl =
(1 + )(a  ch=)2
4
This is less than (44).
Consider a situation where h selects reward-based crowdfunding and l selects
prot-sharing.
Consider rm l. Similarly to the above analysis we have: p1 = p2 =
a+cl=
2 ,
 = cla and the entrepreneurs expected prot over the two periods equals:
(a  cl)(a  cl=)
2
(50)
Consider rm h. We have p1 = p2 =
a+ch=
2 .
The rms prot over the two periods equals
h =
(1 + )(a  ch=)2
4
(51)
Suppose that h mimics l and chooses equity-based crowdfunding instead. hs
prot hl then equals
hl = (1  l)(p1h(a  p1h)  cl(a  p1h) + p2h(a  p2h)  cl(a  p2h))
It equals
hl =
(a  cl)(a  ch=)
2
This is greater than (51) because cl < ch and therefore such an equilibrium does
not exist.
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Proof of Proposition 6.
Consider reward-based crowdfunding. In period 2, the rm chooses p2 to
maximize (p2   c  b)(sra  p2) which makes p2 = sra+b+c2 (all calculations are
identical to section 2.1. except that the cost equals c+ b).
In period 1, the rm maximizes (p1   b   c)(a   p1)   I subject to p1q1 =
(p1   c)(a  p1)  I + cq1 = I + c(a  p1).
Two cases are possible. If
(a  c  b)2 < 4I (52)
then the rm will not be able to raise enough funds to launch the production.
Otherwise we have p1 = a+c+b2 .
The rms prot over the two periods equals
r =
(a  b  c)2
4
+
(sra  b  c)2
4
  I (53)
Consider equity-based crowdfunding. In period 2, the rm chooses p2 to maxi-
mize (1  )(p2   c  b)(sea  p2) which makes p2 = sea+b+c2 .
In period 1, the rm maximizes (1   )(p1   b   c)(a   p1) which makes
p1 =
a+b+c
2 .
The rms prot equals
e = (1  )( (a  b  c)
2
4
+
(sea  b  c)2
4
)
Since
(
(a  b  c)2
4
+
(sea  b  c)2
4
) = I
we have:
e =
(a  b  c)2
4
+
(sea  b  c)2
4
  I (54)
In the case of bank loan nancing we have p1 = p2 = a+c2 .
The rms prot is:
b =
(a  c)2
2
  I (55)
Since (53) is greater than (54) we have two cases. If I is su¢ ciently small
((a   c   b)2  4I), resulting from the comparison of (53) and (54), the rm
prefers reward-based crowdfunding to equity-based crowdfunding because sr >
se. As follows from the comparison of (53) and (55), the rm selects reward-
based crowdfunding if sr is su¢ ciently large or b is su¢ ciently small. This is
not surprising given that b reects the degree of the moral hazard cost under
crowdfunding and sr reects the e¢ ciency of market feedback. Otherwise, the
rm takes a bank loan.
Let us now analyze the role of demand (a) on a rms decision-making. The
rm is indi¤erent between reward-based crowdfunding and a bank loan if:
(a  b  c)2
4
+
(sra  b  c)2
4
  I = (a  c)
2
2
  I
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This equation can be rewritten as:
(a  b  c)2
2
+
(sra  b  c)2
2
= (a  c)2 (56)
Since this is a quadratic equation, it implies that for any given value of I,
the rm selects equity-based crowdfunding if a is either very small or very large.
Otherwise it takes a bank loan.
If I is su¢ ciently large, the rm will not be able to use reward-based crowd-
funding. As follows from the comparison of (54) and (55), the rm selects
equity-based crowdfunding if se is su¢ ciently large or b is su¢ ciently small.
Otherwise, the rm takes a bank loan.
The rm is indi¤erent between equity-based crowdfunding and a bank loan
if:
(a  b  c)2
4
+
(sea  b  c)2
4
  I = (a  c)
2
2
  I
This equation can be rewritten as:
(a  b  c)2
2
+
(sea  b  c)2
2
= (a  c)2
then proceed in a similar fashion to the above analysis.
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